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Abstract 
 
The study undertakes an empirical investigation to explore institutional 
uncertainty-private investment linkages in select East and South Asian countries, namely, 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Within an analytical framework based on 
emerging option theory of investment, the study provides further empirical support to the 
impact of institutional uncertainty on private investment, using panel data over a period 
of 1982-95.  The findings of the study suggest that gdp growth rate, availability of credit 
and complementary investment in the previous year- all have positive impact on private 
investment. On the other hand, government consumption and exchange rate fluctuation 
are negatively associated with private investment flow. Concurrently, enhanced 
bureaucratic quality and security to property rights are positively associated with 
investment performance, while lack of rule of law is found to deter investment stream. As 
such, the study suggests to improve the quality of institutions in South Asia, notably the 
quality of property rights and the quality of overall governance to promote private 
investment in the region.      
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INTRODUCTION 
  
Prior to beginning of a new millenium, development profiles of the developing 
countries in Asia are marked with extremely varied outcomes. Embarking on growth 
journey during the 1950s with a more or less similar macroeconomic background, a 
number of East Asian countries recorded “miraculous” economic growth during the 
subsequent decades, graduating themselves into a “highly performing economy” status, 
while the South Asian countries are yet to rid from low income equilibrium trap. Among 
variant dimensions of the asymmetric development profiles between the East and South 
Asian countries, uneven private investment performance is unambiguously a major 
hallmark. Compared to a robust growth of private investment in most of the East Asian 
countries, it is yet to exhibit any sustained momentum in South Asia. Given the above, 
there seems to have a great deal of merit in studying the causal mechanics of differential 
private investment performance in the two developing regions in Asia within an 
appropriate analytical framework. The issue assumes enhanced cardinal importance due 
to a paradigmatic shift in development thesis of the South Asian Countries during the 
1980s, marking a switch towards market economy based development regime from “state 
authoritarianism” in development governance. However, despite the past efforts within 
the standardized Bretton-Woods recipes, a desired private investment growth in South 
Asia is presumably deficient in some vital nutrients. In this order, the task of the 
development analysts of the region is to identify the deficiencies in current development 
efforts and explore proximate remedial measures. 
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On the other hand, recent development in both the theory and emperics of Growth 
Economics brought in some important fall-outs. Stepping beyond the strict neoclassical 
orthodoxy, a vibrant stream of studies is currently exploring institutions-economic 
growth causal nexus. In the current growth literature, there is a growing consensus that 
institutional factors are sine qua non for a dynamic spurt of private investment in 
developing countries, hence attaining a durable rapid economic growth. For example, in 
explaining varied private investment performance across developing countries, North 
(1990) argues that enforcement of property rights and contracts determines the incentives 
to invest in cumulative factors. Poorly enforced property rights create a wedge between 
the marginal product of capital and the rate of return that can be privately appropriated by 
the investors. Thus, two countries with the same marginal product of capital may have 
different investment rates if the appropriable returns differ. Consequently, differences in 
institutional quality could explain varied investment performance across developing 
nations. 
  
A similar development is also evident in the emerging investment literature. 
Explicitly focusing on the irreversible property of fixed investment, the option approach 
of investment provides an alternative analytical framework to study the investment 
process in an uncertain business environment. Amidst pervasive institutional uncertainty 
in the developing countries, including South Asia, it provides a powerful analytical tool 
to study the “black-box” of private investment in these developing areas. 
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Against the backdrop, aim of the current study is to systematically explore 
institutional uncertainty – private investment linkages in the context of select East and 
South Asian countries within an option theory based analytical framework. Against the 
partial and deterministic framework of the prevailing studies on determinants of private 
investment in the South Asian region, the study attempts to provide a more complete 
analysis and empirical evidence in this order. For this purpose, it summarizes recent 
analytical discourses and empirical literature on institutional uncertainty and irreversible 
investment to explore proximate linkages between institutional uncertainty and private 
investment. Secondly, it attempts to gauge the empirics of institutional uncertainty and 
private investment link for East and South Asia. In this regard, compared to the tradition 
of cross-section analysis, the study provides empirical evidence on the current research 
topic based on panel data. Hopefully, the study would be able to provide some useful 
clues concerning the deficiencies in current efforts to promote private investment in 
South Asia.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a brief overview of the 
theoretical literature on irreversible investment to formulate the analytica l framework for 
the study purpose. Section II attempts for an exploratory search into the literature to 
explore linkages between institutional uncertainty and private investment. Section III 
focuses on the empirical link between institutional uncertainty and private investment in 
select East and South Asian countries, using panel data. The study concludes suggesting 
few policy implications. 
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I. THE EMERGING INVESTMENT THEORY: AN ANALYTICAL 
OVERVIEW OF UNCERTAINTY AND IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT 
 
Over the past, orthodox investment analysis mainly rallied behind two dominating 
discourses. The neoclassical investment theory as standardized by Jorgenson (1973) 
known as the user cost-of-capital approach, maintains that the firm’s desired stock of 
capital is determined by equating the marginal product and the user cost of capital, while 
the other leading stream, popularly known as the Tobin’s q approach (introduced by 
James Tobin in 1969) focuses on the capitalized value of the marginal unit of capital 
relative to its replacement cost, a ratio known as the Tobin’s q. In both the formulations, 
adjustment cost of capital is typically assumed to be convex which entails an otherwise 
static problem to a dynamic setting involving expectations about the future. 
 
Despite their long dominance in the investment literature, the conventional 
discourses came under severe criticism both on theoretical as well as empirical grounds 1. 
While the Tobin’s q approach suffers from empirical nontestibility (Chirinco, 1993; 
Hasset and Hubbard, 1996; Caballero, 1997), and the Jorgenson’s investment model has 
been rejected on the ground of its limited applicability in the developing countries due to 
technical as well as practical reasons (Khan and Blejer, 1990; Solimano, 1996). 
Particularly, the assumption of convex adjustment cost, cornerstone to both the 
formulations came under serious scrutiny due to its lack of realism. The emerging 
investment analysis identifies three critical pitfalls of the conventional analysis that 
                                                               
 
1. See Abel and Blanchard (1986).  
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eventually guided the subsequent analysis on the theory of investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994). First, unlike the traditional analysis, most fixed capital investments are partly or 
completely irreversible: the initial cost of investment is at least partially sunk which 
cannot be recovered completely by selling the capital once it has been put in use2. Second, 
investment decisions are subject to uncertainty about the future rewards, especially, in the 
face of imperfect capital market in the developing countries 3(Dixit and Pindyick, 1994). 
Given the uncertainties, the best investors can do is to attach probabilities to the possible 
outcomes. Third, investors can control the timing of investment by postponing investment 
decision to collect more information about the future. 
 
 Evolving on the above building blocks, the recent option theory of investment  
views an investment opportunity as an option to purchase an asset at different points in 
time. The optimal investment policy balances the value of waiting for new information 
with the cost of postponing the investment in terms of forgone returns. When a firm 
makes irreversible investment expenditure, it forgoes its option to wait for new 
information that might affect the desirability of investment. To take into account of this 
fact, the standard net-present-value investment rule requires some obvious modifications4. 
The anticipated return must exceed the purchase and installation cost by an amount equal 
to the value of keeping the option alive. The recent investment literature has shown that 
the option value of waiting can be considerable, especially, in a highly  
                                                               
2.
  Arrow (1968) first studied investment irreversibility in a deterministic context.  
3.
  Uncertainty concerning future rewards can originate from numerous sources including the 
institutional uncertainty factors. 
4.  The precise way in which the “naïve” net present value rule needs to be modified is discussed by 
Abel et. al. (1996). 
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uncertain environment. As a consequence, uncertainty can become a powerful deterrent 
even for risk-neutral investors. 
 
 While the above ideas may seem intuitive, the analysis of irreversible investment 
is far from being trivial. Thus, the following discussion is organized around a simple 
example to introduce the basic conceptual framework of the option theory of investment5.  
 
A.  A Simple Dynamic Adjustment Model of Investment 
 
 For the sake of analytical simplicity, let us consider investment decision of a risk-
neutral firm within a two-period dynamic adjustment model. Given the assumption that 
investment is partly irreversible, the firm has the option to decide whether to invest in an 
irreversible project whose purchase cost is Pk and whose future return is uncertain at 
present 6. Further assume that if investment takes place now, the project will yield a 
known return R0 at the end of the current year and an uncertain return R in each 
succeeding year. Given the information available today, the expected value of future 
return from the project is E0[R]. Hence, the present value of the anticipated stream of 
cash flows can be written as follows: 
 
                                                               
5.  The interested reader is referred to the comprehensive discussion in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
6. Presumably, due to uncertainty about the project’s output price, market demand, or other similar        
causes. 
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where r is the discount rate – or the real rate of return on the alternative asset.  
Naïve application of the net present value criterion would suggest undertaking the project 
if Vo > O, which can be conveniently rewritten as: 
 
         (1) 
The absent depreciation rPk in equation (1) is Jorgenson’s (1963) user cost of capital. If 
investment were fully reversible, the optimal decision would be to invest now if and only 
if R0 > rPk  i.e., (current return exceeds the user cost of capital) – because the decision can 
always be undone in the next period in the event of any adverse outcome.  
 
However, even if condition (1) holds ex-ante, the firm may regret its ex-post  
investment decision if there is a chance of R < rPk, so that with some probability, the 
future return will fall short of the cost of capital. In such case, the firm would find it self 
committed to an unprofitable project. Given the probability of such outcome, the firm can 
defer its investment decision to learn more about the future return – perhaps by observing 
the trajectory of output prices or demand determinants --, the decision rule given by the 
condition (1) is incorrect. The reason is that it may pay to wait for more information 
before making an irreversible investment commitment. 
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 As an extreme example, let us consider that uncertainty would completely 
disappear during the next period, so that the future return would remain constant forever 
at whatever value is realized in the next year. In such case, consider a strategy involving 
no action this year – and therefore no cash flows – and undertaking the project next year 
only if the return turns out to exceed the user cost of capital, but not otherwise. The 
anticipated stream of cash flows from this strategy is, 
       
Notice that the entire above expression is multiplied by the probability Pr that the 
project’s return will turn out to exceed the user cost of capital, since only then the 
investment would be taken in the next period. We can compare the two strategies by 
computing 
          (2) 
 
It pays to invest immediately if this expression is negative, which is equivalent to the 
requirement 
          (3) 
 Condition (3) simply compares the cost of waiting – the current period net return 
(R0 – rPk) forgone by not investing – with the value of waiting, given by the irreversible 
mistake that would be revealed tomorrow should future project returns fall short of the 
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user cost of capital (i.e., R < rPk). The expected present value of such mistake is 
measured by the right-hand side of (3): the mistake is made with probability Pr[R<rP k]; 
its expected per-period size, given today’s information, is E0[rPk-R|R <rPk]; and since it 
accrues every period into the indefinite future, it has to be multiplied by (1/r) to transform 
it to present value terms. It pays to invest immediately only if the first-period return 
exceeds the conventional user cost of capital by a margin large enough to compensate for 
the possible irreversible mistake – i.e., if the cost of waiting outweighs the value of 
waiting. 
 
 The notable property of (3) is the ‘good news’, represented by a future realization 
of R above rPk, and is completely irrelevant for the investment threshold. This is the bad 
news principle first noted by Bernanke (1983): only the expected severity of future bad 
news matters for the decision whether to invest today; potential good news does not 
matter at all. The intuitive reason for this asymmetry is that the option to wait has no 
value in states in which adopting the investment would have been the right decision — it is 
only valuable in those states in which early investment would have been regretted. This  
option value of waiting equals the maximum of V1-V0 and 0. If V1 <V0 the option has no 
value, and the optimal decision is to proceed immediately with the investment. 
 
 Even with moderate amounts of uncertainly, however, the value of the option can 
be quite significant. This can be easily drawn by computing the premium above the user 
cost of capital that an irreversible project must offer for investors to give up option to 
wait. Consider a simple example of an irreversible project that with probability .10 will 
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“fail” — in the sense of yielding annual return 2 percentage points below the discount rate 
r – and with probability. 90 will “succeed”. Lettering Pk = 1 and r = .04, we can ask: 
what immediate return R0 must the project offer for a risk-neutral investor to undertake 
it ? Simple calculations using (3) above show that R0 must be at least 9 percent — i.e., five 
percentage points above the cost of capital— for a rational investor to adopt it. 
 
 The key implication of the bad news principle is that any spread of the 
distribution of future returns, which increases downside uncertainty, raises the option 
value of waiting and therefore tends to depress investment.7 In the preceding example, 
assume that we reduce the project’s return in the adverse scenario by 1 percent, so that 
now it falls short of r by 3 percent. With all the parameters unchanged, R0 now must be 
11 percent! Two extra points of premium are now required, because the irreversible 
mistake has become larger. 
 
 
B. Incremental Investment 
 
The above discussion mainly addresses discrete investment decisions, i.e., the 
adoption of specific projects of given size. In reality, however, firms typically operate 
                                                               
7.  However, some exceptions to this rule should be noted. If investment is at least partially reversible, 
and the cost of investing tomorrow is relatively high (i.e., Pk is rising over time), the asymmetry 
could be reversed into a “good news” principle, whereby only upside uncertainty would matter, 
and its effect would be to hasten investment (Abel et. al., 1996). Likewise, if the opportunity cost 
of waiting Ro is uncertain rather than known – as would be the case for investment projects are 
subject to completion lags – and the firm can abandon the project (at a cost) in the future, then 
again, higher uncertainty could hasten investment by making extreme favorable realizations of Ro 
more likely (extreme adverse realizations would also become more likely, but the firm could avoid 
their impact by shutting down the project) and thus raising the cost of waiting along with the value 
of waiting (see Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996). 
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many projects, and their investment decisions can be better viewed in terms of 
determining the path of their total capital stock. 
 
 Bertola (1988) and Pindyck (1988) first analyzed the optimal irreversible 
investment policy of a firm facing uncertainty. They considered the case of a firm 
possessing a decreasing-returns technology and facing a downward-sloping demand 
schedule. Under such assumptions, successive marginal increments to the capital stock 
can be regarded as distinct “projects”, each of which contributes its marginal product 
independently of the others. Hence, similarly to the above discussion, it is possible to find 
an investment threshold for each project, and then sum over the different projects to 
obtain the firm’s desired capacity expansion. As before, the profitability threshold that 
must be reached for investment to take place exceeds the user cost of capital as 
conventionally computed, and rises with the degree of uncertainty faced by the firm. 
 
 The characterization of the investment threshold, and its relation with the existing 
degree of uncertainty, have been recently re-examined in a more general setting by Abel 
and Eberly (1994, 1995a). They provide a framework in which downward adjustment of 
the capital stock is possible, but more costly than upward adjustment, and allow also for 
the existence of convex adjustment costs to investment similar to those assumed by the  
conventional investment literature. 8  Hence, the standard q investment model can be 
viewed as a particular case of this general setting (Hayashi, 1982). In this framework, the 
                                                               
8.  They also allow for “flow” fixed costs – i.e., costs whose magnitude is independent of the volume 
of investment but dependent on the length of the period over which investment takes place. This 
contrasts with “stock” fixed costs, which are independent of this latter factor as well. Stock fixed 
costs lead to “lumpy” investment, as analyzed by Caballero and Leahy (1996). 
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optimal investment strategy is a two-trigger policy that can be expressed in terms of 
Tobin’s marginal q – defined as the addition to the value of the firm resulting from an 
additional unit of capital. If q exceeds a certain upper threshold q+, positive gross 
investment occurs. In turn, if q falls below a lower threshold q- , negative gross 
investment takes place – i.e., the firm sells part of its capital stock. Between q+ and q-, 
investment equals zero.        
 
 
                    Figure 1 
Investment with Costly Reversibility 
q 
 
   q+ = P+K + C’ (0+) 
 
       q- = P-K + C’ (0-)  
          I 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Investment with Linear Adjustment Costs 
pK 
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            p+K 
            (r +d) P+K 
 
            (r +d) P-K  
 
         I 
 
This optimal policy can be illustrated with the help of Figure 1, adapted from 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), which shows the marginal cost of investment as a function of 
investment. In the absence of fixed costs, the total cost of investment (disinvestment) 
equals the capital purchase (sale) cost (revenue) plus the standard convex adjustment cost. 
In general, the slope of the latter may differ for positive and negative investment. In such 
framework, the upper threshold q+ is equal to the purchase price of capital, denoted Pk+, 
plus the marginal adjustment cost to positive investment evaluated at zero investment, 
denoted C’(0)+. Likewise, the lower threshold q- equals the sale price of capital Pk- plus 
the marginal adjustment cost to disinvestment evaluated at zero, C’ (0). 
 
If the q is above q+, investment is positive, and if q is below q-, investment is 
negative. Between q+ and q- there is a range of inaction. Such range exists as long as (i)  
Pk+ > Pk-, so that capital can be sold only at a loss; or (ii) marginal adjustment costs are 
steeper for positive than for negative investment, i.e.,C’(O+) > C’ (O-); or (iii) there are 
fixed costs to investment (ignored in the figure). Moreover, investment is determined 
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exclusively by Tobin’s (marginal) q, by Pk+ and Pk-, and by the parameters characterizing 
the adjustment cost function9. 
 
If convex adjustment costs are ruled out, investment occurs in episodic bursts. 
The firm’s optimal policy involves purchasing or selling capital to keep  its marginal 
revenue product between an upper and a lower bound, pk+ and pk- (Abel and Eberly, 
1995a). When the marginal revenue product reaches either of these bounds, a burst of 
investment (positive or negative) occurs to equalize the actual and optimal capital stocks. 
In turn, if the marginal revenue product is between both bounds, no action is taken (see 
Figure 2). These bounds can be interpreted as the correctly measured user cost of capital 
relevant for investment and disinvestment, respectively. Specifically, pk+ (respectively, 
pk-) exceeds (falls short of) the conventionally defined user cost of capital, that would 
equal (r+d)Pk+ (or  (r+d)Pk- for disinvestments). Most importantly, higher uncertainty 
increases the wedge between the upper and lower bounds, and thus the range of inaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Uncertainty and Investment 
 
                                                               
9.  If  C’(O-)<O and/or fixed costs exist, it is possible that q-< O, in which case negative investment 
will never be observed, as implied by the strict irreversibility hypothesis. 
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The models just described characterize the critical threshold that must be reached 
by the marginal profitability of capital in order for investment to occur. They predict that 
if volatility increases, the investment threshold will also rise – firms will be more 
reluctant to invest to avoid getting caught with too much capital, should the future turn 
out worse than expected. By contrast, if the future turns out better than expected, the firm 
can just add more capital as needed. 
 
 However, the models do not characterize the impact of volatility on investment. 
Such impact depends in addition on the effects of volatility on the marginal profitability 
of capital. For example, if the marginal revenue product of capital is a convex function of 
the variable whose evolution is uncertain (e.g., the output price or the real wage), then 
higher uncertainty raises expected profitability and, ceteris paribus, the desired capital 
stock (Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983). This effect goes in opposite direction to the threshold 
effect above, and the net result is in general indeterminate. As shown by Caballero (1991), 
decreasing returns to scale and/or imperfect competition – either of which makes the 
marginal revenue product of capital a decreasing function of the capital stock – make it 
more likely that the threshold effect will dominate, so that higher uncertainty leads to 
lower investment.10 
 A second difficulty is that, even if the threshold effect dominates so that 
irreversibility and uncertainty reduce investments (or the desired capital stock) ex-ante in 
                                                               
10.  In the special case of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, the opposite result obtains 
(Caballero, 1991). The reason is that the marginal revenue product of capital (whether current or 
future) does not depend on the capital stock, and therefore the firm is no more reluctant to invest 
under irreversibility than it would be with perfect reversibility. However, the effect of aggregate 
(as opposed to idiosyncratic) uncertainty on investment of a competitive industry can still be 
negative (Caballero and Pindyck, 1992). 
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the short run, little can be said on their long-run impact (Bertola and Caballero, 1994). 
Higher degrees of irreversibility and/or uncertainty make it more likely that firms will ex-
post  find themselves holding too much capital. This (Abel and Eberly, 1995b) tends to 
increase the long-run capital stock above the level that would have prevailed with less 
irreversibility or less uncertainty.11 
 
 However, some inferences about the impact of uncertainty on investment can still 
be drawn from these models. In particular, temporary increases in uncertainty should 
reduce investment, at least in the short run, because fewer projects will exceed the higher 
investment threshold resulting from increased volatility. 
 
D. Aggregate Investment 
 
 The above discussion has been mainly preoccupied with the investment decision 
of a single firm. From the macroeconomic point of view, however, the question of 
primary interest is the impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on aggregate investment. 
Yet it is obvious that one cannot just translate mechanically the above microeconomic 
results to aggregate investment decision. In reality, we never observe the spells of zero 
aggregate investment that should arise if all firms in the economy faced the irreversibility  
                                                               
11.  The lack of a more robust linkage between uncertainty and investment through irreversibility has 
led some researchers to look for alternative rationalizations. One example is the “disappointment 
aversion” analyzed by Aizenman and Marion (1995). 
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constraint – or were all at once in the range of inaction identified in microeconomic 
models. Instead, aggregate investment displays considerable smoothness and inertia.12 
 
 To assess the role for irreversibility in aggregate investment, it is therefore 
essential to take explicitly into consideration the heterogeneity of individual firms’ 
investment decisions. Each firm adjusts its capital stock when profitability exceeds a 
firm-specific threshold, reflecting managerial abilities, output market conditions, and 
other idiosyncratic factors. At any given time, some firms may be close to their trigger 
points and others far from them. Firms may be subject to both aggregate shocks, which 
tend to push all firms above or below their investment trigger points, and specific shocks, 
which push different firms in different directions. Thus the response of aggregate 
investment to an aggregate shock may display substantial inertia, as different 
microeconomic units reach their investment thresholds at different times – even though 
each firm’s policy may involve a discrete investment burst once its idiosyncratic 
threshold has been reached. 
 
 However, aggregation of individual firm’s investment policies is not easy because 
as we saw above, under irreversibility, such policies are nonlinear. Thus, the impact of a 
given economy-wide shock on aggregate investment depends, for example, on how many 
individual firms are within their inaction ranges, how far they are from their trigger 
points, and how important are idiosyncratic shocks relative to aggregate shocks. 
 
                                                               
12.  Indeed, the original rationale behind the standard convex adjustment-cost approach to investment 
was precisely to replicate these two empirical facts. 
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 Bertola and Caballero (1994) have recently explored the implications of 
irreversibility for aggregate investment in a model in which individual firms’ investment 
proceeds in discontinuous bursts. Individual investments are not synchronized, and firms 
are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty in addition to aggregate uncertainty. As a result, 
aggregate investment shows smoothness. A favorable aggregate disturbance (e.g., a fall 
in the price of capital goods) may have a very small effect on aggregate investment if 
many firms are far below their threshold for positive investment, and may take a long 
time to develop its full impact, which depends on initial conditions – i.e., on firms’ 
original situation relative to their respective investment thresholds. 
 
E. Empirical Application of the Uncertainty and Irreversible Investment 
Theory  
 
 Despite its rapid development at the theoretical front, progress of irreversible 
investment theses lagged far behind at the empirical level. The main reason is of course 
the analytical complexity of irreversible investment models, which typically involve 
nonlinear investment rules, whose empirical estimation is computationally cumbersome. 
As a result, most of the existing empirical studies of the impact of irreversibility adopt a 
reduced-form approach. 
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 Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. At the microeconomic level, an 
important recent study by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), using a large sample 
of U.S. plant- level data, uncovers strong evidence of irreversibility. Using a simple 
structural model of irreversible investment, the authors find that adjustment of the capital 
stock to its optimal level is highly nonlinear, and typically much faster for upward than 
for downward movements in the capital stock – as should be the case if retiring capital is 
more costly than acquiring it. 
 
 Leahy and Whited (1995) use the same type of data in a reduced-form empirical 
approach. They note that in most models of irreversible investment, the effect of 
uncertainty on investment operates through Tobin’s (marginal) q. If such models are an 
accurate description of reality, uncertainty should have a negative impact on q but no 
independent impact on investment, once q has been controlled for 13 . Their empirical 
results using U.S. data provide support to this view. Likewise, recent empirical work by 
Nilsen and Schiantarelli (1996) using Norwegian plant - level data in a reduced-form 
framework also uncovers evidence of irreversibility and lumpiness in investment. 
 
 At the aggregate level, Bertola and Caballero (1994) have developed a structural 
modal that follows explicitly from the aggregation of individual firms’ irreversible 
investment rules. The resulting specification of aggregate investment is able to capture 
                                                               
13.  Stric tly speaking, this is true as long as investment does not involve (stock) fixed costs. In the 
opposite case, investment is lumpy, and bears no monotonic relation to marginal q. See Caballero 
and Leahy (1996). 
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the key features of the U. S. data14. Caballero (1993) applies a similar approach to 
developing country data, with equally promising results. 
 
A different approach is followed by Pindyck and Solimano (1993) to test for the 
effects of uncertainty on aggregate (and also sectoral) investment. It is to be noted that 
the long-run impact of uncertainty on investment is ambiguous on theoretical grounds, 
but its impact on the profitability threshold above which firms will invest is unambiguous. 
Thus, a test of the importance of irreversibility can be performed by investigating the 
dependence of that threshold on measures of uncertainty. Using panel data for industrial 
and developing countries, such empirical exercise reveals a moderate impact of the 
variability of the marginal profitability of capital on the investment threshold.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT  
                                                               
14.   See also Caballero and Pindyck (1992). 
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LINKAGES: AN EXPLORATORY SEARCH INTO THE EXISTING 
LITERATURE 
 
The theoretical formulations of the irreversible investment thesis as overviewed in 
the earlier section mainly emphasize on output demand and/or prices as the basic sources 
of uncertainty. However, it would be clear from the current discussion that uncertainty 
arising from other sources could have exactly the same effect on irreversible investment 
decisions, as an expanding literature has underscored numerous forms of institutional 
uncertainty and private investment linkages.  
 
Given the above, an exploratory search is made in the current section to 
comprehend various transmission links through which institutional uncertainty can 
impact upon private investment. It would help understand the theoretical underpinnings 
of the current subject and guide to build up an appropriate analytical framework for the 
study purpose.  It would also be useful to comprehend an integrated domain of 
institutional uncertainty as opposed to any partial perception.     
 
A number of analytical as well as empirical studies have recently emerged to 
study institutional uncertainty-private investment nexus within the option theory of 
investment. While the largest part of empirical literature evolved around macroeconomic 
policy induced institutional uncertainty, and the second strand examines the effects of 
lack of property rights and socio-political uncertainty on private investment. These 
studies focus on the role of government instability, unstable incentive regime, social 
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unrest, and fundamental uncertainties about property rights. Although the earlier studies 
sought to identify institutional uncertainty-private investment linkage in the realm of 
different forms of macroeconomic volatility originating from the failure of desired 
macroeconomic governance, a growing stream of discussion within a broader 
institutional domain is exploring the given issue incorporating more direct institutional 
uncertainty measures. Given the above, it would be reasonable to review the two major 
streams separately as the same.  
 
A. Macroeconomic Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment Behavior 
 
Bulk of the prevailing studies on the current subject suggest that investment 
uncertainty in the developing countries predominantly originates from suboptimal 
macroeconomic regime that results in policy uncertainty and ultimately impairs private 
investment. Inappropriate policy design, non-credible macroeconomic governance, 
distributive politics of both monetary and fiscal regimes---all breed various forms of 
macroeconomic instability leading to a pervasive response of private investment. 
Particularly, macroeconomic instability in tandem with socio-political instability and 
poor state of property rights can culminate into a sluggish private investment 
performance.  
 
 
Credibility, Policy Reversal, Uncertainty and Irreversible Investment 
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From the policy viewpoint, an extremely important form of uncertainty faced by 
investors is the imperfect credibility of policy regimes. Investment-friendly reforms 
typically raise expected returns, but may also increase uncertainty if investors believe that 
the reform measures could be reversed. In such context, investors’ perceptions about the 
probability of policy reversal become a key determinant to the investment response. The 
possibility of policy reversal creates a value of waiting for investors facing irreversible 
projects. Thus, lack of confidence can be reflected in a weak and delayed investment 
response, as it may take time for investors to become convinced that the reforms will be 
sustained. This pattern is in fact consistent with the “investment pause” often observed in 
the aftermath of adjustment programs in developing countries. 
 
One of the earlier studies on the current subject is undertaken by Blejer and Ize 
(1989) which stresses on endogenous uncertainty of policy adjustment rather than “state-
of-the-world uncertainty” in the event of any internal/external shock. It formalizes the 
existence of self-fulfilling pessimistic equilibria from: i) the limited ability of political 
systems to support the political and social costs of adjustment while carrying through on 
a stable and predictable basis, ii) the strong sensitivity of investment to the prospects of a 
protracted and uncertain adjustment, particularly when waiting becomes an attractive 
alternative. The political uncertainty attached to the strength of the political system is 
thus accompanied by “coordination” uncertainty, which arises when multiple equilibria 
exist and agents can not predict which equilibria will guide other agent’s expectations 
and behavior. The study describes the condition under which one type of uncertainty or 
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the other dominates in which investment is not guided by the availability of savings, 
rather by the investor’s own subjective assessment of credibility content of the policy 
regime and associated adjustment costs 
 
Explicitly, based on the uncertainty-option theory of investment, Fischer (1991) 
provides an analytical model of alternative transmission links through which 
macroeconomic instability can detriment private investment. The study combines the 
irreversibility and timing dimensions of investment with major macroeconomic 
instability measures originating from suboptimal macroeconomic governance. The study 
suggests that in a situation of macroeconomic instability in tandem with irreversible 
nature of investment, a risk-neutral investor requires a premium to make an investment, 
which has the same second period expected return as his alternative investment 
opportunity. The reason is that with waiting an even higher return can be achieved, once 
uncertainty is resolved (or narrowed down). The premium required for immediate 
investment is higher the larger is the probability of bad macroeconomic state and the 
larger the discrepancy between foreign rate of return that prevailing in the adverse state. 
The crucial aspect of sluggish investment response is the lack of credibility of 
macroeconomic regime that directly affects private investment.   
 
The study of Rodrik (1989) which derives its tools from the literature of hyteresis 
provides a similar analytical exposition of private investment and policy uncertainty. His 
model provides a “simple formula” that relates the size of the implicit tax to the 
subjective probability that policy reforms will collapse and to magnify the irreversibility 
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in the investment process. It stresses the trade-off between stability and reform, under 
reasonable conditions, may be quite steep, in the sense that even a subjective probability 
of reform collapse may render harmful than otherwise sensible reforms pertaining to 
private sector investment. The study also discusses various ways in which probability of 
reform collapse can be determined endogenously, which leads to the possibility of 
multiple equilibria wherein pessimistic expectations can be entirely self- fulfilling. The 
central equation of the study links the entrepreneur’s response to the magnitude of reform, 
the ex-ante probability of sustainability and the magnitude of capital irreversibility (entry 
and exist cost). It also shows that potential policy uncertainty, including the probability of 
policy reversal, acts as a tax to investors which can be endogenously determined under 
alternative assumptions. Consequently, unless policy reform is sufficiently large, 
significant compensation to the investors is necessary to avoid hyteresis effect on capital. 
The analytical framework also sheds light on an important trade-off between reform and 
stability. When a policy reform is introduced, it is almost inevitable that the private sector 
will view it as less than one hundred percent sustainable. At one level, there will be the 
expectation of the political economy configuration that supported earlier policies. At 
another, since new policies take the economy into uncharted terrain, there will be the 
legitimate fear that unexpected consequences will lead to reversal. Hence, with the 
possibilities of policy reversal, hyteresis effect on capital becomes well evident. As earlier 
mentioned, the study provides an analytical framework which endogenizes the 
probability of policy reversal through three transmission links, i) political economy and 
creating entrenched interests; ii) through effects on external balance and reserves; and iii) 
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through effects on fiscal balance. Although the study provides a neat analytical 
exposition, nevertheless it refrains from any further empirical investigation.   
 
A later study by the same author (Rodrik, 1991) shows that a reform favorable to 
capital, but regarded as less than fully credible, will fail to trigger off an investment 
response unless the return on capital becomes high enough to compensate investors for 
the losses they would incur should the reversal take place. Van Wijnbergen (1985), who 
considers the case of a trade reform suspected to be only temporary, reaches similar 
qualitative conclusions. He shows that the result can be a decline in investment in both 
the traded and non-traded goods sectors, as investors wait for additional information and 
thus avoid irreversible commitment to any particular industry. 
  
Thus, the perception that reforms may be unsustainable can have a very adverse 
impact on investment. However, it is important to recognize that the sustainability of 
reform is ultimately endogenous, and depends largely on the response of the private 
sector. Lack of a sufficient investment response can delay growth, increase social 
hardship, and ultimately force the reversal of the reforms, confirming investors’ initial 
skepticism. 
  
Laban (1991) formally investigates this endogeneity in a model in which investors 
can repatriate capital flight following a stabilization that lacks full credibility. Investors 
face a choice between irreversible fixed investment and liquid assets, and the latter have 
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an option value, due to the lack of confidence in the permanence of the stabilization. At 
the same time, however, the sustainability of the program depends on its ability to 
generate sufficient fixed investment – a mechanism ignored by the individual investor. 
The study shows that in these circumstances, the outcome of the stabilization is generally 
indeterminate, as investors’ expectations can become self- fulfilling: pessimism leads to 
insufficient fixed investment and thus to collapse of the stabilization program, while 
optimism leads to the opposite result. The underlying reason is that the combination of 
investment irreversibility and strategic complementarity of investors’ decisions create an 
externality that drives a wedge between the social and private returns to investment. 
 
A relatively recent study by Aizenman and Marion (1995) investigates the 
correlation between macroeconomic volatility and private investment using the 
disappointment-aversion expected utility model first expounded by Gul (1991). The 
central implication of their disappointment-aversion utility framework is that when 
private investors are disappointment-averse they put more weight on “bad” outcomes and 
less weight on “good” outcomes than in the standard case. The asymmetric weighting of 
outcomes introduces additional concavity into the utility function and causes volatility to 
have significant, negative effects on economic performance. The large, negative effects 
of increased volatility continue to hold even with the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
is zero15. 
                                                               
15.  That is, even if the marginal utility of income is constant so that, agents are risk-neutral in the conventional               
  sense. 
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A recent empirical study by Ibarra (1995) also focuses on the effects of credibility. 
He explores the case of the Mexican trade liberalization of the late 1980s, which was 
accompanied by a substantial private investment slump. Drawing from cross-country 
evidence, he estimates empirically the path of the probability of reform reversal, and 
shows that it can contribute to explain a substantial portion of the observed investment 
slowdown. 
 
Empirical Aspects of Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Private Investment 
 
A central issue related to the current research topic is how to quantify the quality 
of macroeconomic regime for systematically analyzing the private investment response. 
A convincing answer to the question depends upon finding good proxies for policy-
induced macroeconomic instability. The relevant literature in this order suggests that 
there are several dimensions to this type of policy induced instability. Given the nominal 
interest rate, the present value of an investment project depends on such factors as 
expected future demand, the expected future price level and on expected relative prices. 
Fiscal policy, monetary policy, debt management and exchange rate policy can all have a 
significant impact on these variables. Where the supply of inputs are rationed to some 
degree by the government, expectations about allocations of key resources are of key 
significance. Even the pricing policy imposed on public utilities is potentially important. 
In this order, what is important to know about some measures that can capture how well 
governments have managed their fiscal and monetary affairs. Poor fiscal management 
creates temptation to resort to the inflation tax, and inflation is liable to create relative 
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price distortions as well as uncertainty about the general price level. The external 
monetary dimension is also critical. Poor exchange rate management may generate 
volatility in the real exchange rate, and hence in internal relative prices.  
 
A majority of the empirical studies on the current subject suggest that private 
investment responds strongly to changes in output and income. Investment in developing 
countries is no exception, and most econometric studies conclude that fluctuations in 
output are one of the most important determinants of private investment (Blejer and Kahn, 
1984; Faini and de Melo, 1990; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Solimano, 1997). The 
initial downturn in economic activity often associated with macroeconomic adjustment 
may affect investment through its effect on expectations. A current recession could 
produce “pessimistic” expectations that lead investors to postpone investment until the 
recovery arrives; this phenomenon in turn may prevent the take-off of investment 
(particularly in projects with short gestation lags) and delay the recovery itself, and the 
economy could get stuck in a low investment equilibrium because of insufficient 
investment as a result of a self- fulfilling pessimism.  
 
One of the direct measures of unstable monetary policy is the volatility of money 
supply as hypothesized by Barro (1976, 1980). Likewise, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
found negative association between monetary variance and private investment response. 
Also, Aizenman and Marion (1995) observed similar negative impact of nominal money 
growth volatility on private investment in a cross-section of developing nations.  
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Inflation is one of the grand routes of investment uncertainty that very often is 
triggered by policy failures16. Nevertheless, one is confronted with two opposing views at 
analytical front as regards the inflation-private investment linkage. While the Mundel-
Tobin effect implies that an increase in expected inflation increases capital accumulation, 
a variety of other mechanisms produces the opposite correlation. The negative effect of 
inflation on the efficiency of the exchange mechanism suggests that higher inflation 
reduce private investment via multiple effects. Higher inflation can reduce investment 
capacity by reducing income level17. Inflation can result in distortionary “signal effect” to 
a private investor by distorting the relative price level. Besides, it ultimately appears as a 
capital tax to the investor (Fischer, 1991). Also as Fischer (1991) argues, inflation is an 
important indicator of overall ability of the government to manage the economy. A 
failure of combating inflation can generate expectational pervasiveness coupled with 
eroding credibility of the policy regime relating to private investment.  
 
As noted earlier, most of the empirical studies incorporated inflation as one of the 
determinants of private investment in their empirical analysis. Pindyck and Solimano 
(1993) maintain that inflation appears to be a major cause of macroeconomic volatility 
and it is negatively related to investment performance. Recently, Yeyati (1996) proposed 
a reinterpretation of this result in the context of a structural model of irreversibility that 
highlights the role of current inflation as predictor of the future price volatility faced by 
investors. He offers some empirical evidence in support of this view. Likewise, a number 
of studies overwhelmingly testify a negative linkage between inflation and private 
                                                               
16.  Vulnerability to inflation can also result from structural rigidities in the developing countries 
coupled with numerous institutional pervasiveness such as distributive politics of the fiscal regime.  
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investment (Aizenman and Marion, 1995; Barro, 1989; 1991, 1996 and 1998; Bleaney, 
1996; Fischer, 1991; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; and Serven and Solimano, 1992; 
Solimano, 1997). Finally, a recent work by Ghosal and Loungani (1996) focuses on the 
impact of price uncertainty on investment using panel data for U.S. manufacturing 
industries. For those subsectors with a high degree of product market competition, they 
find a large negative and significant effect of price volatility on sectoral investment. 
Along these lines, Serven and Solimano (1993b) find a significant negative impact of 
inflation and real exchange rate volatility on private investment using panel data for 
developing countries. 
 
Another well-documented transmission link of macroeconomic instability is 
related to fiscal imbalance. As some studies suggest, chronic budget deficit might be 
associated with crowding out of private investment. A chronic fiscal deficit can exert 
various tax and non-tax pressures against the private investors. Also, it could lead to 
severe credit rationing. Besides, it might reduce investment friendly public investments, 
like investment in infrastructure and investment in R &D. Concurrently, an inefficient 
mode of deficit management is thought to engender investment uncertainty. Based on the 
above hypotheses, several studies attempted to explore linkages between fiscal imbalance 
and private investment. For example, Woi and Wong (1982) record a strong negative 
correlation between fiscal deficit and private investment. Similar result is evident from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17. Extensively documented by Fischer (1991) and Barro (1989, 1991, 1996, 1998).  
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later studies, namely by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Fischer (1991), Levine and 
Renelt (1992), Aizenman and Marion (1995) and Bleaney (1996)18.  
 
The case of uncertain tax policy is addressed by Hassett and Metcalf (1994). They 
show that an increase in the volatility of taxes (specifically, an investment tax credit) has 
the usual effect of raising the hurdle rate required by investors to undertake irreversible 
projects. However, they also conclude that the overall impact on investment generally 
depends on the specific form taken by tax uncertainty.  
 
Complementary to the above is the relation of private investment with public 
spending and public investment. The most popular hypothesis concerning public 
spending is its potential crowding out impact on private investment. Several regression 
analysis of Barro (1989, 1991, 1996) report a systematically negative impact of public 
spending as measured by government consumption/gdp ratio on investment across a 
cross-section of developing nations. However, considerations should be taken into 
account concerning the nature of public spending. Lack of adequate public spending on 
social sectors can act against the promotion of private investment. Similar mixed analysis 
can be found concerning the potential impact of public investment. The popular belief 
suggests various counterproductive impacts of public investment on the desired growth of  
private investment, although the causal relationship is not intrinsic in nature19. In broad 
terms, public sector investment can crowd out private investment if it utilizes scarce 
                                                               
18. However, Solimano (1997) records positive association between fiscal deficit and private 
investment across developing countries.  
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physical and financial resources that would otherwise be available to the private sector, or 
if it produces marketable output that competes with private output. Furthermore, the 
financing of public sector investment —whether through taxes, the issuance of debt, or 
inflation— will lower the resources available to the private sector and depress private 
investment activity. Yet public investment that is related to various forms of 
infrastructure coupled with the provision of public goods and investment in institutional 
capacity building can enhance the possibilities for private investment and raise the 
productivity of capital, increase the demand for private output through increased input 
demand and ancillary services, and augment overall resource availability by expanding 
aggregate output and savings (Khan and Blejer, 1990). Consequently, the overall effect of 
public investment on private investment will, therefore, depend on the relative strength of 
these various effects, and there seems to be no a priori reason to believe that they are 
necessarily substitutes or complements.  
 
In the empirical analysis, one can note that the way public investment is 
introduced into the model significantly influences the measured statistical correlation. 
Bulk of the studies concentrate on crowding out aspect (Galbis, 1979; Goldbrough et al., 
1996; Heller, 1975; Wai and Wong, 1982; Sundarajan and Thakur, 1980; Ozler and 
Rodrik, 1992), while few studies (Greene and Villanueva, 1989; Khan and Blejer, 1990) 
report a positive association between public investment and private investment response20.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19.  The extreme version of crowding out exposition conceives an increase of public investment is  
matched by an immediate and equal decline in desired rate of private investment (David and 
Scadding, 1974). 
20.  Most of the above-cited studies represent  cross -section  analysis against a handful of  time  series  
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Importantly, the study of Khan and Blejer (1990) found that public investment related to 
infrastructure is positively related with private investment, while the nonifrastraucture 
component of public investment crowds out the private investment. Musalem (1989) 
found evidence of complementarity between private and public investment in a time-
series study of investment in Mexico. However, Balassa (1988) reported cross-section 
estimates showing that public and private investment are negatively related, with an 
increase in public investment leading to a decline in private investment.21  
 
In the 1980s, many developing countries undertook sharp real depreciation as part 
of their adjustment to the debt crisis. A real depreciation affects investment through three 
main channels: the real cost of capital goods; the real interest rate; and real output.22 
 
 First, a real depreciation tends to raise the real cost of capital goods relative to 
domestic goods. The reason is that in most developing countries capital has a high import 
content (mainly machinery and equipment), whose relative price is increased by a real 
devaluation). As argued by Buffie (1986) and Branson (1986), this situation tends, ceteris 
paribus, to depress investment in non-tradable activities. However, the opposite happens 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
studies. Cardoso (1990) presents regression of panel data for six Latin American countries.  
Changes in terms of trade, variability of GDP growth, and the share of public investment are all 
significantly correlated with private investment. 
21. Khan and Reinhart (1990) reexamined the issue of the differentials in productivity between private 
and public investment for a sample of 24 developing countries and found that the marginal 
productivity of public sector capital was negative, although not significantly so, while that of 
private investment was significantly positive. 
22.  A real depreciation may also have potentially important effects on the timing of investment, 
depending on the degree of financial openness in the economy and on the import content of capital 
goods.  
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in the traded goods sector: the real cost of new capital goods in terms of final goods falls 
and investment rises. The result for aggregate investment is therefore uncertain. Despite 
this theoretical ambiguity, most empirical studies conclude that in the short run a real 
depreciation has an adverse impact on investment through this cost-of-capital-goods 
effect (although its long-run effect may be positive). 23 In general, a high dependence on 
imported capital and intermediate goods and a relatively low share of the traded goods 
sector in total investment would make the contractionary result hold. 24 
  
A second channel through which devaluation affects the profitability of 
investment is the real interest rate. Devaluation raises the price level through its impact 
on the cost of imported intermediate inputs and wages under indexation; if monetary 
policy does not fully accommodate the increase in the price level, real money balances 
fall, pushing up the real interest rate for a given rate of (anticipated) inflation. Hence, the 
cost of capital to the user rises and investment falls. On the other hand, if the devaluation 
is anticipated and if it succeeds in eliminating the expectations of a devaluation, then it 
may result in an expansion of investment since the required return on capital would tend 
to fall, a reflection of the reduction in the anticipated rate of depreciation. 25 
 The third channel through which devaluation may affect investment is through its 
impact on aggregate demand. If the devaluation reduces aggregate demand ex ante, then 
                                                               
23. Musalem (1989) found that in Mexico, the devaluation had an adverse investment effect. Faini and 
de Melo (1990) arrived at similar results using data for 24 developing countries. Solimano (1989), 
on the basis of an empirical simultaneous equation model for Chile derived from an extended 
Tobin’s q approach, also concluded that a real depreciation reduced investment in the short run.  
24.  See Lizondo and Montiel (1989) for a detailed analysis on this issue. 
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ex-post  investment is likely to fall. Moreover, if investment has a significant import 
content, then an expansion in output is likely to be a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for investment not to fall ex-post  (Serven, 1990). The literature on 
contractionary devaluation (Krugman and Taylor, 1978; Wijnbergen, 1985; Solimano, 
1986; Edwards, 1986; Lizondo and Montiel, 1989) emphasizes on how slowly the 
substitution effects of a devaluation emerge; hence, in the short run the impact of a real 
devaluation on aggregate demand is dominated by its adverse effects on income: it 
generates transfers of real income abroad (because of the likely initial external 
imbalance) from wage earners (low savers) to profit recipients (high savers) —a pattern 
that tends to reduce aggregate demand.26 If the net effect of a currency devaluation is 
contractionary, then the slump in economic activity is likely to form the basis for 
investors to cut investment spending. However, with sufficiently strong substitution 
effects (for example, a large impact of devaluation on net exports), greater output and 
investment could result —an expansionary outcome that becomes more likely as time 
passes and the substitution effects gradually come into play. 27 
      
A major influence on the relative profitability of various activities is the real 
exchange rate. In the debate about external trade orientation and growth, several 
researchers have attempted to assess whether real exchange rate misalignment exerts any 
dampening impact on private investment. Various cross section studies incorporating 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25. In fact, whether this shift takes place will depend on the degree of capital mobility and import 
content of investment; see Serven (1990). 
26.  A real depreciation may also have adverse supply-side effects that lead to a contraction in output, 
such as the increased real cost (in terms of domestic goods) of imported inputs and the rise in the 
costs of working capital (because of higher interest rates). 
27. See Solimano (1986) for an evaluation of these J curve-type effects of devaluation on output in 
Chile. 
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different forms of exchange rate distortionary proxies report a consistently negative 
impact of exchange rate distortion on private investment growth (Caballero and Corbo, 
1988; Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Cardoso, 1990; Cottani, et al., 1990; Fischer, 1991; 
Solimano, 1990; Dollar, 1992; Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Aizenman and Marion, 1995; 
Bleaney, 1996). More recently, Greene and Villanueva (1991), using a panel of 23 
developing countries, found complementarity between exchange rate policy and private 
investment. Particularly, the study of Fischer (1991) provides an excellent analytical 
exposition of how foreign exchange black market premium can detriment incentive 
structure of private investment through numerous transmissions channels. Both Fischer 
(1991) and Serven (1996) report negative impact of black market premium on private 
investment. Also in similar vein, using the panel data, Lopez and Edwards (1989) record 
a negative impact of real exchange rate variability on private investment. Likewise, Dixit 
(1989), and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) focused on real exchange rate uncertainty. 
They showed that sunk costs of entry might discourage firms from moving into export 
activities that would appear profitable in the light of current real exchange rate levels. 
    
Another stream of researchers more directly focused on trade policy uncertainty 
and its impact on private investment. Lopez (1989), using the trade policy indicators as 
developed by Haveli (1988) report negative impact of unstable trade policies on private 
investment. Also, Blejer and Ize (1989) analyze the confidence-eroding phenomenon of 
inconsistent trade policy within an integrated confidence gap and adjustment cost 
framework. A recent study by Goldsbrough et al. (1996) found dampening effect of 
unstable and “distortionary” trade policy on private investment in select eight developing 
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countries. A complementary research area is the impact of instability of export on private 
investment.  Several studies, namely by Glezakos (1973), Voivodas (1974), and Ozler 
and Harrigan (1988), found negative association between export instability and private 
investment in the developing countries. Serven (1996) tests instability indicators in a 
sample of African countries and reports a significant negative association between 
investment and terms-of-trade variability. Aizenman and Marion (1995) also report 
negative impact of terms of trade volatility on private investment. Hausman and Gavin 
(1996) present similar result for the Latin American countries.            
 
Another major policy-induced investment uncertainty encompasses financing 
aspect of private investment. The restrictive monetary and credit policies usually included 
in stabilization packages tend to raise the cost of capital to users by raising the real cost 
of bank credit, a major source of investment financing in developing countries, and by 
increasing the opportunity cost of retained earnings. The result is a decline in investment 
through both mechanisms. The empirical relevance of this effect has been confirmed in a 
number of studies (for example, de Melo and Tybout, 1990; Greene and Villanueva, 
1990; Solimano, 1989), but others have not found a significant effect of interest rates on 
investment demand. The reason is that in the repressed financial markets that characterize 
many developing countries, credit policy affects investment directly through stock of 
credit available to firms with access to preferential interest rates, rather than through the 
indirect channel of interest rates –although the latter will also operate for firms that 
borrow in the unofficial money market (Wijnbergen, 1983). Besides, the perverse 
political economy of credit allocation can hamper desired rate of private investment. The 
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rates of return on investment in the developing countries typically tend to be high, 
whereas real rates on loanable funds are kept low due to a variety of reasons. In such 
circumstances, the investor cannot be expected to equate the current marginal product of 
capital to its service cost (Blejer and Khan, 1990). Indeed, because the total amount of 
financing is limited and price mechanism is not allowed to operate smoothly, it would 
seem legitimate to hypothesize that the available bank financing restricts the private 
investor in a developing country. Any effect exerted by the rate of interest on private 
investment is not direct within this rationing framework, but, rather, occurs via channel of 
financial savings 28 . Particularly, the rudimentary nature of capital markets in the 
developing countries limits the financing of private investment to the use of retained 
profits, bank credits and foreign borrowing. Of these, the flow of bank credit to the 
private sector would perhaps tend to be quantitatively the most important. An increase in 
real credit to the private sector will encourage real private investment, and rolling over 
bank loans can sufficiently lengthen the maturity of debt. 
 
The role of foreign capital flows in the domestic private investment has been 
documented by Weisskopf (1972), Stillson (1976) and Wai and Wong (1982). The effects 
of foreign financing are broadly similar to the effects of variations in bank credit--both 
tend to increase investable fund. Since the control of the total bank credit usually is the 
principal instrument of monetary policy in developing countries29, through varying the 
composition of credit between the public and private sectors, the government can affect 
                                                               
28. Galbis (1979) and Fry (1980, 1982) provide excellent discussion on the effects of interest rate on 
private investment.  
29. Other tools of monetary policy, such as open-market operations, have a limited role where capital 
and bond markets remain relatively underdeveloped. 
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the speed and ability of private investors to respond to achieve their desired levels of 
investment. Monetary policy thus can have a direct as well as potent influence on the rate 
of private investment. Consequently, distortions and uncertainties concerning credit 
allocation can negatively contribute private investment. At the empirical level, a number 
of studies found a close association of credit uncertainty and negative response of private 
investment in the developing countries (Wai and Wong, 1982; Khan and Blejer, 1990; 
Greene and Villanueva, 1990; Fischer, 1991; Goldbrough et.al., 1996; Bleaney, 1996).  
 
Also, the distributive politics of credit rationing often found to act as  disincentive 
to the majority private investors (Rama, 1990; Khan and Blejer, 1990; Goldbrough et.al., 
1996). Many empirical studies note this direct role of credit availability (for example, 
Wijnbergen, 1982; Blejer and Kahn, 1984; Lim, 1987; Dailami, 1990). Hence, the 
institutional set-up of the financial markets in developing countries is an important 
ingredient in the transmission mechanisms of monetary and credit policy with respect to 
investment. However, Ingersoll and Ross (1992) examine the consequences of interest 
rate uncertainty in a context in which future investment returns are known. They show 
that interest rate uncertainty creates a value of waiting; moreover, a decline in interest 
rates accompanied by an increase in their volatility can actually reduce investment (see 
also Tornell, 1990). Thus, to promote investment, the stability of interest rates might be 
more important than their levels.  
 
From the above discussion, it is evident that institutional uncertainty pertaining to 
both quality and predictability of macroeconomic policy can affect private investment 
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performance. Especially, prevalence of numerous market imperfections and structural 
rigidities in the developing countries assigns more weight on quality of policy regime for 
steering the trend of private investment. It is also found that there are some agreed 
measures among the researchers on how to quantify uncertainty of policy regime for any 
systematic analysis purpose.          
 
B. Socio-Political Instability, Quality of Property Rights and Private Investment 
Behavior  
 
The current discussion attempts to explore the institutional uncertainty-private 
investment linkage from a broader perspective, incorporating the socio-political milieus 
of institutional uncertainty, uncertainties stemming from quality of governance, and   
property rights in developing nations.  Similar to the earlier discussion, it would 
undertake an exploratory search into the existing literature in order to identify different 
forms of institutional uncertainties, contesting hypotheses, and how they are incorporated 
into empirical exercise. Nevertheless, institutional uncertainty encompasses a vast 
domain with multifaceted dimensions. Besides, overlapping characteristics of 
institutional factors make it almost impossible for any additively separate analysis and 
discussion. However, on the basis of the current inventory of the studies, one could  
classify the studies into two major categories. They are: i) uncertainties originating from 
various forms of socio-political instabilities; and ii) uncertainties associated with fragile 
property rights and enforcement. Although, poor quality of property rights might be 
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partly due to socio-political instability30, they are treated separately by most of the studies 
due to their individual gravity of importance in the context of private investment.       
 
Impact of Socio-Political Instability on Private Investment 
 
There is unanimous consensus among the development analysts that political 
stability is an essential prerequisite for fostering private investment. Particularly, political 
instability amidst numerous socio-economic structural rigidities in the developing 
countries can endanger the property rights system. Political instability can exert negative 
effects on investor’s behavior leading to “too little interpersonal exchange” and “too little 
intertemporal exchange” 31 . One strong theoretical argument underlying the negative 
relationship between political uncertainty and private investment is based upon the 
effects of uncertainty on productive decisions encompassing investment, production, or 
labor supply. A higher incidence of political instability is associated with increasing 
policy uncertainty, particularly, in the event of frequent government changes. In such 
events, risk-averse economic agents may hesitate to take economic initiatives or may 
“exit” the economy by investing abroad. Conversely, foreign investors prefer a stable 
political environment, with less policy uncertainty and less insecurity about property 
rights 32 .  Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Cukierman, 
Edwards and Tabellini (1992), Ozler and Tabellini (1991) present several models in 
which a government is uncertain about its survival, and as a result engages in suboptimal 
                                                               
30. However, one might also consider the reverse causation that political instability is due to the lack 
of property rights.    
31. Both the effects tend to result in short run bias in decision making and preferences and prefer 
consumption against investment. For a detailed explanation, see North (1990).  
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policies in order to “worsen” the state of the world inherited by its successor. Actually, 
one can conceive of endless cobweb transmission links between political instability and 
private investment uncertainty, which is beyond the scope of the current study. For the 
study purpose, it only recognizes the well-documented hypothesis that political instability 
can generate perverse forms of instability, particularly in the exchange system that 
dissuades private investment (Barro, 1991, 1996, 1998; Rodrik, 1989, 1998; Rodrik and 
Ozler, 1992; Alesina and Perotti, 1993). 
 
In a recent study, Svensson (1998) provides an analytical model that addresses the 
question why investment rates differ so markedly across countries. The model is laid out 
explaining why governments in unstable and polarized societies may not have sufficient 
incentives to undertake legal reform so as to fully protect property rights, and how this 
may hold back private investment. The model also yields some testable predictions 
regarding the link from political instability to the quality of property rights, as well as the 
link from property rights to investment. These predictions hold up when confronted with 
cross-country data for about 100 countries. In particular, once the quality of property 
rights is controlled for, the different measures of political instability and polarization 
employed have no direct effect on private investment. Thus, a possible link between 
political instability and investment is identified. Results of a similar study by Poirson 
(1998) provide fur ther empirical support to the view that enhanced economic security 
fosters private investment and growth in the developing nations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
32. Goodrich (1992) finds that foreign direct investment have been negatively affected by a high 
degree of political instability in a large sample of LDCs. 
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One of the central issues in this regard is how to define and measure socio-
political instabilities for any empirical estimation purpose. In the relevant literature, 
political instability has been identified broadly in two ways. The first one emphasizes 
executive instability. The second one is based upon indicators of social unrest and 
political violence. The first approach defines political instability as the “propensity to 
observe government changes”. These changes can be “constitutional” i.e. take place 
within the law, or “unconstitutional”, i.e. they can be coups d’etat. The basic idea is that a 
high propensity to executive changes is associated with policy uncertainty and, in some 
cases, with threats to property rights. It is to be noted that the “propensity” to executive 
changes is distinct from the actual frequency of changes, and can be measured by probit 
regressions in which the probability of a change in the executive is related to several 
economic, socio-political and institutional variables. For example Cukierman, Edwards, 
and Tabellini (1992), and Edwards and Tabellini, (1991) adopt this definition of 
instability in their work on inflation. Alesina, et al. (1992) develop a structurally linked 
analytical model where political instability is endogenized by a probability index of 
government change. In their estimated two-equation system: one equation is a probit 
regression, which estimates the propensity to government changes, while the other is 
regression for investment growth. The key results of the study are: i) in countries and 
time periods with high propensity of government collapses, growth and investment 
significantly lower than otherwise33; ii) they have found no evidence that growth and 
investment is significantly different between authoritarian regimes compared to 
democracies; and iii) lack of political stability (defined as frequent government collapses) 
                                                               
33. Unlike Barro (1991), Scully (1988) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985) avoided the joint 
endogeneity problem between economic growth and political instability measures.  
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increases the probability of additional collapses. Londegran and Poole (1990, 1991), and 
Block Bomberg (1992), taking into the account of joint-endogeneity, applies the same 
probit regression approach.  
 
The second approach to measuring political instability does not focus directly on 
executive changes. Socio-political instability is measured by constructing an index, which 
summarizes various variables capturing phenomena of social unrest. An important 
reference on this point is Hibbs (1973), who uses the method of principal components to 
construct such index. More recently, Venieris and Gupta (1986, 1989), Gupta (1990), 
Barro (1991, 1996, 1998), Ozler and Tabellini (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel (1992), and 
Mauro (1993) have used several indices of socio-political instability as an explanatory 
variable in various regressions in which dependent variable is growth/investment.  
 
Which of the two approaches to measuring political instability described above is 
preferable is not clear a priori and may depend upon the specific issue under 
consideration. For instance, one may argue that for a given level of expected government 
turn over, phenomena of social unrest do not have any direct impact on policy uncertainty, 
and therefore on economic decisions. This might be strong but useful “identifying” 
assumption: policy changes relevant for economic decisions can occur only governments’ 
change. On the other hand, one may argue that particularly when it reaches very high 
levels, social unrest disrupts market activities and increases economic uncertainty above 
and beyond its direct effects on executive instability. Mass violence, civil wars, socio-
political disorder, and physical threats to workers and entrepreneurs engaged in 
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productive activities can have direct effects on productivity and therefore on return on 
productivity.  
 
As political uncertainty can be construed from different dimensions, several 
authors used various indicators related to political instability in their regression equations.  
For example, Barro, (1989, 1991, 1996, 1998) uses a set of “objective” political 
instability variables namely, assassination, revolution, political executions, and war 
casualties into the directly specified regression equations 34. In all the studies, Barro found 
a systematically negative linkage between political instability and investment in the 
developing nations. The pioneering study of Barro inspired a number of further studies in 
the same direction (Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel, 1992; Block-Bomberg, 1992; 
Mauro, 1993; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Hausman and Gavin, 1996; Serven, 1996; 
Bleaney, 1996).  
 
In the similar vein, a group of researchers use various subjectively constructed35 
political instability measures in their empirical exercise. Venieris and Gupta (1983) 
develop a “sociopolitical instability” index consisting of a set of sociopolitical instability 
indicators36. According to the study, sociopolitical instability is deeply entrenched with 
deprivation of the populace, state of alienation and the consequent violent reaction of 
people. The sociopolitical index is intertwined with an aggregate “frustration index” of 
                                                               
34. One notable hypothesis in this regard is coined is coined Gossman (1991) which says that in 
countries where rulers are weak i.e. more easily overthrown, the probability of revolutions is 
higher and the citizens have higher incentives to engage in revolutionary activities rather than 
productive market activities. Nevertheless, the hypothesis has many theoretical rivals. 
35. Primarily based on the Delphi method. 
36. The variables are: riots, political demonstration, and political strikes, armed attack events and  
 deaths from political violence. 
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the economic agents, which in turn is dependent on a number of observable economic 
variables and the government “coercion index”. The study reports a negative impact of 
sociopolitical instability on the private investment. Interestingly, it found that lower 
income countries are more vulnerable to sociopolitical maladies compared to the higher 
income nations. Using a different set of subjective measures, Knack and Keefer (1995) 
report similar negative result. Incorporating a comprehensive set of measures of 
sociopolitical instability, a recent study by Brunetti and Weder (1997) report similar 
result. 
 
One important aspect associated with socio-political instability is the nature of the 
governance regime and magnitude of civil liberty.  Although, it is generally conceived 
that democracy and civil liberty are conducive to economic prosperity, however, the 
rationale is contested both on theoretical and empirical fronts37. As regards civil liberty, 
the study of Kormandi and Meguire (1985) estimates negative effect of lack of civil 
liberty on private investment using the “Gastil Index” for civil liberty over a period of 
1950-77. Interestingly, in their estimated investment equation, inclusion of civil liberty 
variable “virtually eliminates the effects of all the other variables in explaining 
investment- income ratio” 38 .  In the similar vein, Veneries and Gupta (1983) report 
negative impact of lack of civil liberty as proxied by an index of government coercion. 
Scully (1988), on the other hand, separates political liberty from the civil liberty39. Using 
                                                               
37. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) provide extensive survey on the  
 current discussion. 
38.  Civil liberty alone explains 45 percent variation of investment ratio. 
39. The political liberty connotes to the degree to which individuals in a state have control over those  
  who govern. The civil liberty purport to measure the rights of the individual relative to the state 
 (like the independence of the judiciary, freedom of press, etc.). 
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a data for 1960-1980, the study found statistically significant positive relation between 
civil liberty and private investment. A growing number of studies report similar result 
(Barro, 1991, 1998; Serven, 1996; Hausman and Gavin, 1996; Brunetti and Weder, 1997).  
 
Concerning the effects of democracy on private investment, the results are not 
unambiguous. Scully (1988) reports that politically more open states with more 
inclination towards free market regime tend to grow faster and invest more than the 
politically closed countries. Exclusively focusing on democracy and private investment in 
select Latin American countries for the period of 1970-86, Pastor and Hilt (1993) found 
significantly positive impact of democracy variables on private investment. Similarly, 
recent studies of Barro (1996, 1998) report positive impact of democratic governance on  
private investment up to certain ceiling level of lower income, implying a nonlinear 
correspondence.  
 
One major source of political instability is the unequal income distribution. The 
rich literature on income inequality and economic growth suggests numerous adversaries 
of inequality on economic growth. As for explaining private investment behavior, one 
can notice over the recent years, the contribution of a number of commendable studies 
from different analytical perspectives with powerful insights (Ozler and Rodrik, 1992; 
Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1996, 1998).  
In development literature, one can find two opposing views pertaining to the “direct 
links” between income inequality and investment.  The first is a Kaldorian view (Kaldor, 
1956), which holds that more inequality favors more accumulation, because rich save 
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more than the poor do. The second view rests on the effects of inequality on the demand 
for fiscal redistribution. This argument implies an inverse relation between inequality and 
investment in physical capital (Alesina and Rodrik, 1991; Bertola, 1991; Pearson and 
Tabellini, 1991)40. At the empirical level, the results are not unambiguous. Sometimes, it 
is observed that the two opposing direct effects may cancel out each other (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1993).  
 
However, there are several indirect “channels” through which income inequality 
may dissuade private investment. A number of researchers, namely, Alesina and Perotti 
(1993), and Ozler and Rodrik (1992) postulate “political transmission process” through 
which income inequality impacts upon private investment. The former study investigates 
the validity of two propositions, first, “more unequal societies are more politically 
unstable: in particular, political stability can be enhanced by the presence of a wealthy 
middle class, and secondly, “political instability has adverse effect on growth and 
investment”. In other words, impact of inequality on private investment is explored via 
                                                               
40. Tornell and Lane (1996, 1998) recently coined a “voracity model of growth” where redistributive 
fiscal conflicts among the powerful multiple interest groups within a brittle institutional 
environment, spawn voracity effect on growth and eventually undermines investment. 
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the political instability channel. In this order, they construct an index of sociopolitical 
instability as suggested by Hibbs (1973). Further, the index is structurally linked with a 
number of economic variables and the income share of the middle class. The estimated 
results of the regression equation evidently confirm their main propositions.   
 
The latter study (Ozler and Rodrik, 1992) focuses on the distributive struggle 
between labor and capital in the urban, manufacturing sector41.  The investment climate 
of the country is considered to be partly determined by the distributive politics between 
labor and capital. They formalize the relationship between labor and capital as a “non-
cooperative game” in which each side has one “weapon”: workers have politics on their 
side, and have the ability to enlarge their share of the pie by taxing capital; capitalists 
have economics on their side, and can withdraw investment (and engage in capital flight) 
as domestic tax increases. The equilibrium of the game determines the tax on capital and 
the level of domestic investment as functions of exogenous variables. Also, the external 
shocks are formalized into the system, namely through global interest rate shock, or 
reduction in capital inflow to the public sector, which hit the system at different points. 
While the interest shock affects private investment demand, the net resource transfer 
affects the government budget. In both the cases, the shocks interact with the distributive 
struggle to affect the equilibrium level of tax on capital. Also, the political transmission  
mechanism could either dampen or magnify the fall in investment. The dampening 
scenario is more likely when the initial redistributive politics is low, while the 
magnification scenario is more likely when redistributive activity is initially high. The 
                                                               
41. It is a similar sort of study to Pazarbasioglu (1991), who studies the distributive politics between 
labor and capital in the context of the developing economies.  
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analytical model has three building blocks: i) a policy reaction function, ii) specified 
investment behavior; and iii) determination of worker’s activity. Taking a cross-section 
data for 1975-85 including 32 developing countries, their main conclusions are: i) 
urbanization has a statistically significant impact on private investment (as it caters more 
intense distributive politics) and an interest shock in private investment is larger in more 
urbanized societies; ii) political rights variable has a statistically significant negative 
parameter estimate implying that effect of an external shock on investment is larger in 
countries with more restricted political systems.  
 
In an attempt to explain why poor countries have tended to invest and accumulate 
at rates lower than the rich countries, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) provide a game-
theoretic model of conflict between social groups over distribution of income. The study 
emphasizes the relationship between levels of wealth, social and political conflict, and 
incentives for accumulation42.  In this political economy model, returns to investment are 
appropriable by the other groups. This framework transforms the accumulation problem 
into the “commons” problem that may lead to underinvestment equilibria. It focuses on 
second-best subgame perfect equlibria to show that growth rate can be indeed wealth 
dependent. Poor countries may indeed accumulate at lower rates because even for the 
best sustainable equilibria, the incentives for appropriation can be much stronger at low 
level of wealth than at high ones, and therefore the momentary advantages of defection 
can be overcome only with high consumption and low investment rate. Although, the 
                                                               
42. The study is indirectly related to the studies done by Pearson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Grossman (1991), Tornell and Velasco (1992), Lane and Tornell (1996, 1998). 
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study provides a new insight on linkage between income inequality and private 
investment, its empirical validity is yet to be tested.  
  
Impact of Quality of Property Rights on Private Investment 
 
In the emerging literature of New Institutional Economics (NIE), fragile 
institutions, particularly poor quality of property rights are identified as the  key peril of 
path dependent lower level private investment trap in the developing countries (Olsen, 
1982; North, 1990). Lack of well assigned as well as well enforced property rights 
arrangement can devastate private investment flow through various channels. An 
interesting analytical model, propounded by Tornell and Velasco (1992), formalizes a 
differential game among a group of conflicting interest groups over an appropriable 
“commons” that eventually leads to capital flight as the preferred option, thus reducing 
domestic private investment43.   
 
One major dimension of the quality issue boils down to the country’s legal system 
concerning the property rights. Here, the central theme is whether the property rights are 
well assigned. Another major dimension of the quality issue relates to enforcement of 
property rights system. Well-assigned property rights can collapse due to lack of proper 
enforcement. Evidently, the facet involves a country’s quality of governance, particularly,   
                                                               
43. External effects and strategic complementarities may play an important role in determining 
institutional efficiency. Putnam (1993) argues that a tragedy of the commons may expla in the 
institutional failure in both developed and underdeveloped areas. Andvig and Moene (1990), Sah 
(1991), Tirole (1993) derive models with multiple equlibria with corruption. Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) derive a model of multiple equilibria in corruption and economic growth.  
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quality of bureaucracy and quality of judiciary system. Although theoretical development 
concerning property rights system has a long tradition, the empirical analysis of property 
rights system in connection to economic growth and investment got momentum only 
during the recent past.  
 
Looking into the emerging literature, one can identify various stylized measures 
that have evolved to capture quality of property rights. Some widely used measures 
include quality of judiciary, efficiency of bureaucracy, corruption, rent-seeking, 
enforcement and repudiation of contracts, credibility of government and rule of law. All 
the above factors are considered as prerequisites for an efficient property rights system in 
a market economy regime. Consequently, deficiency of these factors detriment  
spontaneous development of private investment. 
 
One of the pioneering works in the current subject is provided by Scully (1988), 
who incorporates an index of civil rights (proxied for independence of judiciary) into the 
regression equation. The study reveals remarkably high positive association between    
property rights and growth and investment within market based allocation system. 
Societies with a market based allocation system coupled with well assigned political, 
civil and property arrangements significantly grow faster and invest more compared to 
the institutional have-nots. In their widely known study, Knack and Keefer (1995) 
exclusively focus on various aspects of property rights.  Using the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) data, the study incorporates various institutional measures namely, 
expropriation risk, rule of law, repudiation of contracts by government, corruption, 
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quality of bureaucracy and contract enforceability into their regression equation. The 
statistical estimates of the relevant  parameters unambiguously support the earlier 
hypotheses.  
 
Following the same path, a number of studies have recently emerged using more 
comprehensive institutional indicators. One study by Brunetti et al. (1997) develops a 
“credibility of rules index” collecting primary data from a worldwide survey. 
Incorporating the credibility index with other familiar institutional and macroeconomic 
policy uncertainty variables together into the regression equation, their study documents a 
statistically significant correlation between private investment and credibility as well as 
predictability of the rule of law. A later study by the same authors (1997) systematically 
focuses on institutional uncertainty and investment response in the developing countries.  
Taking almost all the institutional measures used by the earlier studies, they attempt to 
integrate macroeconomic policy uncertainty and nonpolicy aspects of institutional 
uncertainty into a single calculus. In this order, they classify four sets of variables, 
namely, i) government instability; ii) political violence; iii) policy uncertainty; and iv) 
enforcement instability. Constructing three indices for the nonpolicy institutional 
uncertainty, their regression estimates confirm statistically significant negative 
correlation between institutional insecurity and private investment in the developing 
nations. 
 
Corruption is one very important aspect of governance issue in the context of 
private investment. The debate on the effects of corruption is particularly fervent. 
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Beginning with Left (1964) and Huntington (1968), some authors have suggested that 
corruption might raise growth and investment through types of mechanisms. First, 
corrupt practices such as “speed money” would enable individuals to avoid bureaucratic 
delay. Second, government employees who are allowed to levy bribes would work harder, 
especially in the case where bribe acts as a piece rate. While the first mechanism would 
increase the likelihood that corruption can be beneficial to private investment only in 
countries where bureaucratic regulations are cumbersome, the second would operate 
regardless of the level of red tape. In contrast, Shlefier and Vishny (1993) argue that 
corruption would tend to lower investment and Rose and Ackerman (1978), warn about 
the difficulty of limiting corruption to areas in which it might be economically desirable. 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) provide evidence that countries where talented 
people are allocated to rent-seeking activities tend to grow more slowly.   
 
Considering corruption as the prime explanatory variable, Mauro (1995) provides 
a neat analytical model for determining the impacts of corruption along with other 
stylized institutional variables on growth and investment in developing countries. In this 
order, he constructs two institutional indices, political stability index and bureaucratic 
efficiency index. The political stability index includes political change within 
institutional framework, political stability, probability of opposition takeover, stability of 
labor, relationship with neighboring countries, and terrorism. While the bureaucratic 
efficiency index includes, judiciary, magnitude of red tape and intensity of corruption. To 
address the endogeneity problem, he introduces a “Ethno-linguistic Fragmentation Index” 
as an instrumental variable in 2SLS regression. Both OLS and 2SLS estimates confirm a 
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negative and significant association between corruption and investment rate 44 .  The 
magnitudes of slope coefficients measuring the association between corruption and 
investment are far from being significantly different in low-red tape and high red-tape 
samples of countries which evidently rejects the hypotheses of Left (1964) and 
Huntington (1968). The efficiency of bureaucracy also has a statistically significant 
coefficient with the expected sign 45.  The estimated results also show that in addition to 
affecting investment through political instability and bureaucratic inefficiency, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization imparts a direct link in dissuading private investment.   
 
Corruption and rent seeking are organically interwoven. However, it is agreed 
upon that both maladies are stemmed from imperfect institutional arrangement. The vast  
literature of rent seeking evidently confirms that a higher incidence of rent seeking is  
associated with higher dead-weight loss and lower private investment. A recent study by 
Rama (1993) provides an endogenous growth model where unequal distribution coupled 
with bureaucratic failures proliferate lower growth and reduced private investment  
                                                               
44. The magnitude of the effect is considerable. A one-standard deviation increase (an improvement) 
in the corruption index is associated with 2.9 percent of GDP.  
45. A one-standard deviation increase (improvement) in the bureaucratic efficiency increases the 
investment rate by 4.75 percent of GDP. In fact its significance level increases when controlled by 
ELF instrument. 
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III. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL 
UNCERTAINTY ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN SELECT EAST AND 
SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES  
 
The current section provides an empirical analysis on impact of institutional 
uncertainty on private investment in select 11 South and East Asian countries over a 
period of 1982-1995. The countries included in the study are: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand. Since the study covers only 11 countries for a period of 14 years, a pooled 
cross-section time series analysis seems appropriate for empirical exercise. Under certain 
conditions and specifications, pooling provides more efficient estimation, inference, and 
possibly, predic tion (Vinod and Ullah, 1981; Jayaraman, 1996). A generalized least 
square (GLS) estimation procedure is adopted for correcting three different sources of 
error correlations: (i) heteroskedastcity among cross-sectional data for the eleven 
countries, ii) time series autocorrelation among each cross-section, and iii) 
contemporaneous correlation on cross-sectional dependence. 
 
Model Specification 
 
Following the conventional practice in the empirical literature, a reduced form 
approach is adopted in the present study to cardinally test proximate linkages between 
institutional uncertainly and private investment. Among a long list of potential 
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explanatory variables in the empirical literature, the study includes the most commonly 
used institutional uncertainty regressors. Also, nonavailability of a comprehensive 
institutional data set prevented the study to include other institutional variables.  
 
For the empirical analysis, the panel specification is as follows: 
 
PRIit = a0 + a1 GDPi t -1 + a2 PCR i t + a3 PRIV i t + a4 INF i t -1 + a5 EXR i. t -1 +  
a6 GCON i t  + a7 RULE i t-1 + a8 BRQ i t-1 + a9 SECU i t-1 + a10 RDUMY +eit  
 
where the subscript i denotes a given country, while t refers to the year of observation. 
PRI is private investment/gdp ratio, GDP denotes annual gdp growth rate, PCR refers to 
private credit/gdp ratio, PRIV stands for private investment in the previous year, GCON 
is annual government consumption/gdp ratio, INF is annual inflation rate, EXR refers to 
exchange rate fluctuation measured by standard deviation, “RULE” is proxied for law 
and order situation, “SECU” is an index of security of property rights (defined as lower 
order of expropriation risk and government repudiation of contract), BRQ is an index of 
quality of bureaucracy (defined as bureaucratic efficiency and progress in corruption), 
RDUMY is a regional dummy (0 value for South Asia and 1 for East Asia) and  eit is the 
stochastic noise term. 
 
It should be noted that under the option approach of investment analysis, given 
the option of waiting, there is expected to have a delayed response of uncertainty on ex-
post private investment. Given the assumption, one year time lag is introduced in both  
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macroeconomic and direct institutional explanatory variables in the above regression 
equation. The contesting hypotheses associated with the explanatory variables in the 
current model have been discussed in detail in the earlier section.  
 
Following the earlier studies, inflation and exchange rate can be considered to be 
exclusively macroeconomic policy induced uncertainty indicators. Real gdp growth in the 
previous year is a standard regreesor of private investment, quite extensively used in the 
empirical literature (Barro, 1990; Solimano, 1990, 1996, 1997). Also from the discussion 
in the previous section, it seems quite reasonable to consider availability of credit to the 
private sector as an explanatory variable, instead of the interest rate for the current 
research purpose. Also, it is quite logical to assume a complementary relation between 
private investment in current year and private investment in the previous year. Apart from 
its direct impacts, investment in the previous year can also have some external effects on 
investment in the current year. Given the irreversible property of investment, there is 
likely to be more complementarity between current year and previous year’s investment 
than the conventional analytical framework. Government consumption is introduced to 
test the crowding out hypothesis of government expenditure. 
 
Given the hypotheses in the empirical literature, the expected signs of the 
explanatory variables in the current model are pretty unambiguous. Coefficients of gdp 
growth, private credit and private investment in the previous year-all are expected to have 
positive association with private investment. Coefficients of macroeconomic uncertainty 
variables, namely inflation and exchange rate are hypothesized to be negatively 
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correlated with private investment. Given its potential crowding out impact, government 
consumption is also likely to be negatively associated with private investment. As regards 
the institutional variables, since they are measured at a positive scale (higher score refers 
to better quality), higher security to property rights (SECU) and higher quality of the 
bureaucracy (BRQ) are expected to have positive signs. On the other hand, a lower state 
of “rule of law” is expected to have negative coefficient. 
 
Data  Source 
 
The study uses a uniform data source for the select 11 countries. Data on 
macroeconomic indicators have been collected from the Annual Yearbook of 
International Financial Statistics and the data for institutional indicators have been taken 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The two indices, security to property 
rights and quality of bureaucracy, have been constructed following the method as 
suggested by Brunetti et al. (1997). The index of security to property rights is constructed 
from two ICRG indicators, namely “repudiation of government contract” and 
“expropriation risk”, while bureaucratic quality index is formulated from two other ICRG 
indicators, namely, “bureaucratic efficiency” and “corruption”.   
 
Results of Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Analysis 
 
Prior to the regression analysis, a proximate linkage between private investment 
and the explanatory variables used in the current model could be explored by studying a 
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correlation matrix, reported in Table 1. It shows simple correlation coefficients at two-
tailed significance level. Besides, it also presents cross-correlations between the different 
indicators.  
 
A cursory look at Table 1 confirms strong association of private investment with 
select regressors in the current model. Also, signs of the correlation coefficients with 
private investment overwhelmingly support the a priori hypotheses. They all support 
earlier findings in the empirical literature. For instance, strong positive association is 
found between private investment and gdp growth, private investment in the previous 
year, and private credit. On the other hand, negative correlation could be seen with 
private investment and macroeconomic policy uncertainty variables, namely inflation and 
exchange rate fluctuation. Concurrently, strong positive association is evident between 
private investment and institutional quality variables. 
 
Summary statistics of pooled cross-section time series analysis are provided in 
Table 2. The overall goodness-of-fit measure, as measured by adjusted R2 which is the 
coefficient for estimating the equation by GLS for a cross-section time series model, is 
high at 0.955. Thus, about 96 percent variation in the dependent variable is explained by 
the interaction of all the select explanatory variables. Further, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
at 1.62 rejects the presence of serial correlation46. In the estimated equation, all the 
parametric coefficients of select independent variables except for inflation, emerged with 
                                                               
46. Although, collinearity diagnostic statistics are not reported in the summary table, but they confirm 
absence of any strong muti-collinearity bias. 
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high degrees of statistical significance, signified by high two-tailed “t” ratios which are 
greater than their respective values at acceptable significance level. 
 
The estimated results are quite comparable to the observations made by earlier 
studies in the empirical literature. Like Barro (1996, 1997), Solimano (1993, 1997), and 
the others, the estimated result reports a moderately positive statistically significant 
relationship between gdp growth rate lagged by one year and current year private 
investment.  Similar to Khan and Blejer (1990), and other representative studies, the 
estimated result perfectly agrees to a statistically significant positive association between 
availability of credit to the private sector and private investment. Conforming to our 
earlier stated hypothesis, a strong positive association is evident between previous year’s 
investment and investment in the current year. The emergence of the previous year’s 
investment as statistically the strongest regressor in the estimates could be interpreted by 
the reasoning that promotion of investment is a path-dependent dynamic process (North, 
1990), and a disruption in current investment flow due to any reason would impair future 
investment stream, given the option of waiting to the investors.  The regression result 
supports crowding out effect of government consumption on private investment in the 
developing countries. Like Barro (1996, 1997), and Alesina (1998), it records a 
statistically significant negative association between private investment and government 
consumption.  
 
As regards the macroeconomic uncertainty variables, the results are mixed. 
Although the inflation coefficient has an expected negative sign, however it appears to be 
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statistically insignificant. On the other hand, exchange rate fluctuation records a 
significant negative impact on private investment.   
 
The estimates of the direct institutional variables are quite unambiguous. Higher 
quality of bureaucracy (defined as lower corruption coupled with higher efficiency) has a 
significant positive impact on private investment. Similarly, a higher scale of security to 
property rights (defined as lower expropriation risk and lower level of government 
repudiation of contract) has a significantly positive link with private investment. Also, 
statistically significant negative coefficient of rule of law variable could be due to  
difference in law and order situation between East and South Asia. Concomitantly, 
significant positive coefficient of the regional dummy hints about some missing factors in 
the current analysis that might have positively contributed higher private investment 
performance in East Asia 47. This observation is similar to the recent findings by the 
representative studies (Alesina, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Solimano, 1998) in the empirical 
literature. 
 
The above results are admittedly quite preliminary and due to their reduced form 
framework, can not be strictly viewed as postulating the causation (rather than simpler 
association) between the variables. Nevertheless, the estimates do indicate that higher 
income growth, availability of credit, complementary investments in the previous year  
are significantly associated with positive private investment performance, while  
 
                                                               
47. They could b educational performance, better infrastructure, or the socio-cultural factors. 
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government consumption and exchange rate fluctuation are involved with a lower 
investment flow. Concurrently, higher quality of bureaucracy, security to property rights 
and higher state of rule of law- all are positively linked with private investment. Thus, on 
the whole, the multivariate regression results appear consistent with bivariate correlations 
examined earlier. 
 
D. A Comparative Analysis of Private Investment between East and South Asia 
 
Although the econometric results in the previous section do not refer to any 
causality, the findings in tandem with available data on the trends of the select 
explanatory indicators could be fairly useful for a comparative analysis of private 
investment between the two developmentally varied performing regions.  
 
Both in terms of level and sustainability of private investment, the East Asian 
region, particularly the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs; except for Taiwan) are 
“super-performers” compared to other developing regions. On the other hand, the South 
Asia appears to be laggard in this score. This is quite evident from Figure 3, which shows  
average private investment trend in the select two regions during the study period (1982-
95). The disaggregate scenarios (Figure 4 and Figure 5) show that Bangladesh and 
Pakistan in South Asia, while Philippines and Indonesia in the East Asian region are poor 
performers compared to their neighbors in the respective regions. Given this stylized fact, 
a closer look at trends of the explanatory variables in conjecture with the empirical 
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findings in the previous section, would suggest that the poor performance in the above 
countries are not at all accidental.  
 
In our estimated equation, higher income growth appears as a significant regressor. 
Given the fact, one can notice a remarkably varied performance in gdp growth between 
the two regions (Figure 6). It should be noted that due to strong negative growth (7.30 
percent in two consecutive years) in Philippines, it shows a sudden drop in the East Asian 
average growth rate during 1984-85. The disaggregate trends (Figure 7 and Figure 8) 
show that the countries with poor income growth in both the regions have lower level of 
private investment, and vice versa (except for Taiwan).  
 
Likewise, given the significant positive association between private credit and 
private investment, one can readily visualize an increasing trend of credit availability in 
East Asia as opposing to its stagnant trend at a lower level in South Asia (Figure 9). At 
intra-regional level, countries with higher private credit are better performers in private 
investment, while the “regional-poors” in private investment, namely Bangladesh and 
Philippines in their respective regions have a precarious level of private credit share 
(Figure 10 and Figure 11). 
 
Given the crowding out phenomenon of public consumption, one can notice a 
declining trend of public consumption in East Asia as opposed to its increasing trend in 
South Asia (Figure 12).  Decreasing trend of private consumption in East Asia is also 
confirmed at the disaggregate level, except for Philippines and Indonesia. While in South 
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Asia, the most notable feature is an ever- increasing trend of public consumption in 
Bangladesh throughout the entire study period. 
 
Turning to the institutional indicators (Figure 20 to Figure 34), one can note a 
significant disparity among the two regions. While the institutional quality is far better in 
East Asia at every front compared to that of South Asia. However, at the aggregate level, 
there are some signs of improvement in South Asia starting from the 1990s. At the 
country level, not surprisingly the countries with poor quality of institutions in both the 
regions are also poor performers in private investment.   So, it could be inferred that a 
relatively higher state of institutional certainty coupled with rapid income growth might 
have positively contributed higher private investment in East Asia, while a lower level of 
institutional certainty in tandem with lower income growth could have some proximate 
causal linkage to the poor performance of private investment in South Asia.  
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Table 1. Correlation Coefficient Table 
 
                                                Correlation Coefficients                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
PRI      GDP       PRIV      PCR        INF        EXR  GCON       RULE     SECU      BRQ  
PRI       1.0000   .4273      .9698      .8360     -.2682     -.2959 -.1974        .5202       .6433       .5976 
P= .     P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .000 P= .014    P= .000     P= .000   P= .000 
GDP     .4273    1.0000      .3688      .4016     -.4561     -.2427 .0605         .3515       .4649       .1873 
P= .000  P= .     P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .002 P= .456    P= .000    P= .000    P= .020 
PRIV   .9698      .3688      1.0000      .8322      -.2279      -.2369  -.1768      .5377        .6363       .6247 
P= .000    P= .000    P= .  P= .000    P= .004    P= .003 P= .028    P= .000    P= .000   P= .000 
PCR     .8360      .4016          .8322     1.0000     -.4642     -.3620 .0617       .6718        .6516       .6078 
P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .       P= .000    P= .000 P= .447    P= .000    P= .000   P= .000  
INF      -.2682         -.4561     -.2279     -.4642     1.0000      .3978 -.3457      -.4927      -.4026     -.3070 
P= .001    P= .000    P= .004    P= .000  P= .000   P= .000 P= .000    P= .000   P= .000   P= .000 
EXR     -.2959        -.2427     -.2369     -.3620      .3978     1.0000 -.2231     -.4048      -.4343     -.3478 
P= .000    P= .002    P= .003    P= .000    P= .000  P= .000 P= .005    P= .000  P= .000   P= .000 
GCON   -.1974       .0605      -.1768      .0617      -.3457     -.2231 1.0000      .4100     .2507      .3453 
P= .014    P= .456    P= .028    P= .447    P= .000   P= .005 P= .000   P= .000   P= .002  P= .000 
RULE    .5202       .3515       .5377       .6718      -.4927     -.4048 .4100     1.0000      .7898      .7603 
P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .000 P= .000    P= .       P= .000   P= .000  
SECU    .6433       .4649       .6363       .6516      -.4026     -.4343 .2507      .7898      1.0000     .6712 
P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .000    P= .000 P= .002    P= .000  P= .         P= .000 
BRQ      .5976       .1873       .6247       .6078      -.3070     -.3478 .3453       .7603     .6712       1.0000 
P= .000  P= .020    P= .000    P= .000   P= .000  P= .000     P= .000    P= .000 P= .000     P= . 
 
(Coefficient /  2-tailed Significance) 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
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Table 2. Results of Cross-Section Time Series Analysis 
                                     
Number of countries =    11 
Number of observations for each country =  14 
Total number of observations =   154 
Adjusted R2 =     .955  
F-ratio =      327.47 
D-W statistic =     1.62  
              (Dependent Variable: Private Investment/GDP; PRI)                     
Regressors     Coefficient  t-ratio     Significance  
Constant      2.774  2.666  * 
GDP growth in last year (GDP)  .178  3.420  * 
Private investment in last year (PRIV) .745  14.311  *** 
Credit to private sector (PCR)  .048  3.489  ** 
Government consumption (GCON)  -.272  -3.753  ** 
Inflation (INF)    -.013  -.409  ** 
Exchange rate fluctuation (EXR)  -.036  -2.624  * 
Rule of law (RULE)    -.647  -3.317  ** 
Private property security (SECU)   .266  2.035  ** 
Quality of bureaucracy (BQR)  .442  2.282  ** 
Regional dummy (RDUMY)   1.161  2.792  **   
*** = at 1 percent level; ** = at 5 percent level; * = at 10 percent level 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has reviewed the emerging investment literature that focuses the 
option value of waiting in the investment process.  In the event of uncertainty originating 
through any transmission channel coupled with irreversibility of investment, waiting can 
become a rational choice to avoid costly mistakes. The recent discourses on investment 
suggest that value of waiting can be extremely high even with moderate uncertainty. Thus, 
the latter becomes a powerful investment deterrent even under strict risk-neutrality. The 
key implication is that, to encourage private investment, stability and predictability of the 
incentive framework — relative prices, demand, interest rate, exchange rate, taxes – may 
be much more important than the level of the incentives themselves. To put it differently, 
huge incentives may be necessary for investors to give up their option to wait and commit 
themselves to irreversible investment in an uncertain business environment. 
 
The central implication for macroeconomic policy is that, to encourage 
investment and facilitate its response to incentive changes, governments should attach top 
priority to correction of unsustainable macroeconomic pitfalls – such as high inflation, 
growing government consumption leading to widening public deficits and exchange rate 
overvaluation – which are a primary cause of macroeconomic instability and uncertainty 
about future policies. Concurrently, institutional reforms to establish rule of law, security 
of property rights and higher quality of bureaucracy can also go a long way to facilitate a 
positive response of investment to incentive changes. 
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The paper has also examined the practical relevance of the uncertainty-investment 
link for select developing countries in East and South Asian region. The statistical 
evidence reveals that institutional uncertainty proxies as used in the current study are 
quite tightly associated with ex-post  private investment performance in the select 
countries. The tight correlation of private investment with select institutional uncertainty 
indicators lends support to the growing consensus in the emerging growth literature that 
quality of institutions is very crucial in explaining varied performance of economic 
growth and private investment among the nations. Also, it provides credence to the 
strengthening recognition onto a broader dimension of institutional uncertainty 
encompassing both economic as well as noneconomic parameters as opposed to a 
deterministic perception. There is a growing support both at theoretical as well as 
empirical fronts that uncertainty breeding from institutional variables like socio-political 
instability, absence of rule of law, less secured property right arrangements can also toll 
against private investment within a market economy regime just like the conventional 
macroeconomic uncertainty parameters.     
 
Although the study does not provide any causal analysis to the varied 
performance in private investment between the two select developing regions, however, it 
provides some useful clues in this direction. The available data amply show that South 
Asian countries are still far behind in terms of quality of their institutions compared to 
their development partners in the East Asian region. Also, it is evident that the investment 
“poors” in both the regions are faltered with lower quality of institutions. The implication 
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is that South Asian countries may have much to gain from progress in reducing economic 
and political instability and improving the quality of their institutions. 
 
In concluding, while the irreversibility approach  brings out a number of relevant 
policy implications, it is important to be aware also of its limitations. Three of them are 
worth mentioning here. First, on theoretical grounds irreversibility cannot explain the 
negative long-term  association between instability (whether economic or political) and 
investment performance found by a number of empirical studies. While such relation 
might arise under particular conditions, it is by no means a general consequence of 
investment irreversibility, and likely reflects the simultaneous action of other factors, 
such as investor risk aversion and limited access to risk diversification. 
 
Second, from an analytical perspective, irreversible investment is only one of the 
factors that can render investment decisions insensitive to changes in incentives. Other 
reasons, such as liquidity constraints (Hubbard, 1994) or fixed costs (Caballero and 
Leahy, 1996) can likewise create a “range of inaction” for investment, in which firms fail 
to tune their investment decisions to changing profitability conditions. 
 
Third, and most important, the irreversibility approach only describes investors’ 
decisions about when (or whether) to adopt profitable investment projects  (or exercise 
their investment "“options"). At least equally important from the policy viewpoint is the 
question of how these profitable investment opportunities arise in the first place. 
Specifically, in the context of South Asia, the question that may merit attention is: what 
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are the key policies that would help generate valuable investment options? The right 
answer surely varies across countries, but investment in human resources, adequate 
infrastructure provision and effective institutions for fostering property rights and social 
consensus would undoubtedly be at the top of the priority order. 
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